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1. Introduction 
This paper offers an exploration of the socialist principle “From each according to their abilities, 
to each according to their needs.” The Abilities/Needs Principle is arguably the ethical heart of 
socialism but, surprisingly, has received almost no attention by political philosophers.1 I will 
propose an interpretation of the principle and argue that it involves appealing ideas of solidarity, 
fair reciprocity, recognition of individual differences, and meaningful work.  
 There is a moderate revival of interest in socialism. In the aftermath of the global crisis of 
2008, many people started to wonder whether there is a desirable alternative to the capitalist way 
of organizing economic life. Socialism provides the historically most important counter-tradition 
to capitalism. But how should we understand socialism today? To answer this question, we can 
think of a fully developed conception of social justice as having three key dimensions. It would 
propose a set of normative principles (DI), certain social institutions and practices that implement 
those principles (DII), and some political strategies of transformation leading agents from where 
they are to the social realizations implementing the principles (if these do not exist already) 
(DIII). Now, it is common to characterize socialism (or communism, a term preferred by many 
Marxists) in terms of dimension DII. Socialism is seen as a form of social organization in which 
economic class division no longer exists and in which workers control the means of production, 
shape the economic process, and benefit equally from it. I think, however, that this narrow focus 
on DII should be avoided, and that we should make discussion of DI more prominent. We cannot 
defend any specific version of DII as desirable without engaging the standards that DI 
illuminates.2 Discussion at DI is also crucial because we cannot simply assume, as many 
socialists did in the past, that socialist transformations are inevitable. History need not move in a 
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socialist direction. To move it in that direction, some political agents will have to become 
committed to socialism and pursue it in practice. Given the mistakes of past socialist politics, this 
point has real bite. Many people need to be convinced that socialism is desirable, and some also 
need to be convinced that socialism is not utterly undesirable. This requires ethical argument and 
advocacy. 
 This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 analyzes the formulation of the Abilities/Needs 
Principle by Marx. Section 3 identifies the principle’s initial plausibility, but shows that it faces 
problems that cannot be addressed without developing a fresh interpretation of it. Sections 4.1-3 
provide an interpretation of the principle that highlights demands concerning opportunities for 
self-realization in work, positive duties of solidarity, sensitivity to individual differences, and 
mechanisms of fair reciprocity. Although it focuses largely on DI, this paper also considers DII 
and DIII. Section 4.4 explores a practical implementation of the socialist principle, and section 5 
discusses some normative puzzles about the transition from capitalism to socialism. 
 
2. The Marxian platform 
The Abilities/Needs Principle (hereafter “ANP”) was formulated by Karl Marx in a late text, the 
“Critique of the Gotha Program.” This is one of the few occasions in which Marx is explicit 
about what socialism (or communism, in his words) would involve. Although my aims in this 
paper are not exegetical, it will be helpful to summarize the key points in Marx’s discussion.3 
They are of intrinsic interest, have been quite influential in socialist thought, and will be 
significant for this paper’s argument. 
 Marx presents two principles of distribution. The first is the so-called Contribution Principle 
(To each according to their contribution), and the second is the ANP (From each according to 
their abilities, to each according to their needs). They are supposed to apply consecutively, in 
	   3	  
two phases of socialism. The second is evaluatively superior to the former. In the early phase part 
of the distribution already caters directly for needs: the Contribution Principle is constrained by 
basic provisions concerning health care, education, and the reproduction of the infrastructure of 
the economy. But the ANPs goes far beyond such basic needs, catering for the conditions for 
everyone’s human flourishing. The ANP also interrupts the translation of inequalities in natural 
endowments into unequal access to consumption goods. The needs of each person count equally 
regardless of the extent of their capability to produce. However, the principle’s implementation is 
not feasible during the early stage of transition, as moral and political culture is still colored by 
bourgeois principles (such as the principle of exchange of commodities with equivalent value—
which disadvantages workers with lower natural talents), and there is not yet enough material 
abundance to support the higher needs of all. It thus makes sense to implement the Contribution 
Principle first. Although less intrinsically desirable, its implementation would ease the transition 
away from capitalism by delivering on its unfulfilled promise to reward productive output rather 
than reflect the superior bargaining power of those in superior class positions. Furthermore, it 
would pave the way for the creation of more desirable distributive schemes by introducing 
incentives to generate the level of material abundance that would make distribution according to 
needs viable and thus a real option. 
 
3. Exploring the ANP 
3.1. Initial appeal 
I find the ANP very appealing. Here are some (related) reasons why: 
 (i) It involves an ideal of reciprocity. As a conjunction of requirements on economic life, the 
principle not only refers to the demand side (to distribution according to needs) but also to the 
supply side (to production according to abilities). (ii) This idea of reciprocity is constrained by 
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considerations of fairness. It involves similarity in effort, not equivalence of output or exchange 
value. If productive efforts are similar, it is fair that receipt of income and other means for need 
satisfaction be equal. This is important because people differ in their native abilities and social 
circumstances. Appealingly, the principle does not condone inequalities in capability to satisfy 
needs that depend on such morally arbitrary (and often unchosen) factors. Marx anticipated 
contemporary “luck-egalitarianism”—the view that it is unfair for some to be worse off than 
others through no choice or fault of their own—when he criticized distributions that “tacitly 
recogniz[e] unequal individual endowment and thus productive capacity as natural privileges”.4  
 (iii) The principle articulates an ideal of solidarity according to which we should produce and 
distribute with the needs of others (besides our own) in mind. Socialism involves positive duties 
to help make the life of others better, or, as Einstein’s puts it, “a sense of responsibility for 
[one’s] fellow men”.5 
 (iv) The principle involves a direct concern with people’s well-being. Resources are only 
means to access well-being, and their distribution’s significance is instrumental. (v) Relatedly, 
the principle is sensitive to the fact that each individual differs from others in important ways 
both in their abilities and needs. So identical incomes or resources will not yield equality in the 
relevant sense. Here Marx anticipated Sen’s challenge to resourcist views of equality as facing 
the “conversion problem” (the fact that, due to different personal, environmental, and cultural 
circumstances, people may not be able to achieve the same level of well-being even if they have 
identical resources).6 
 (vi) Marx’s discussion of the principle addresses feasibility considerations to judge when its 
application is appropriate. Thus, when not enough cultural backing or material abundance is yet 
in place, the implementation of the lower Contribution Principle may be preferable. This 
exemplifies a general, appealing feature of the socialist tradition: its seemingly paradoxical, but 
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in fact consistent and quite fruitful effort to develop proposals for social change that are both 
ethically ambitious and realistic. Socialists invite both serious normative reflection (of the kind 
pursued in moral and political philosophy) and consideration of practical feasibility (as revealed 
by political experience and social science). 
 (vii) Within some strands of the socialist tradition, the principle has been interpreted as 
working in tandem with a demand for democratic control of productive resources and with public 
deliberation about how to specify the economic distributions it mandates. Construed this way, the 
principle helps in the exploration of democracy at the level of the economy besides governmental 
institutions. Since people spend so much of their lives at work, it is important that they have 
opportunities to have a say on how their economic activities are shaped. Since inequality of 
economic power often translates into inequality of political power, it is also instrumentally 
significant to limit the former through economic democracy. 
 (viii) In the socialist tradition, the principle has been taken to require promotion of 
opportunities for self-realization through development and exercise of people’s capabilities in 
meaningful work and other activities. This is an important good (arguably a need) often missed in 
other political views that only focus on income and its use in acquiring consumption goods. 
 (ix) The socialist view that needs ground entitlements to support by others helps challenge an 
extreme ideal of independence as self-reliance. That ideal is infeasible because nobody can 
flourish without substantial help, and it is undesirable because there is intrinsic value in mutual 
support.7 As I see it, the ANP expresses a view of people as producers and beneficiaries in 
inclusive society. There is no shame in getting more (to satisfy one’s needs) than one produces 
(through using one’s abilities) if one makes an appropriate effort to contribute when one can. 
Coupled with effective opportunities to participate and make decisions in production and politics, 
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the positive right to support from others involves solidarity without disrespect for people’s 
productive capacities and autonomy. 
 (x) A socialist concern with access to needs fulfillment has consequences for social design. It 
helps explain why “pre-distributive” measures (such as egalitarian forms of property in means of 
production or access to training) to eliminate concentration of economic power are important but 
insufficient. It is important to directly focus on distribution that supports people’s capability to 
lead flourishing lives. Furthermore, there is reason to rearrange production itself to offer 
producers a more cooperative and fulfilling experience.8 Socialism always emphasizes solidarity 
besides freedom and equality, both at the level of production and distribution. 
 
3.2. Is the principle trivial, redundant, or manifestly inferior to others? 
Some might ask whether it makes sense today to even entertain a view of economic justice based 
in the ANP. Kymlicka provides an instructive example of skepticism.9 He raises a number of 
challenges to the ANP. They can be summarized as saying that the principle may be trivial, 
redundant, or manifestly inferior to others. Triviality may arise if it just restates the familiar idea 
of equal concern for the interests of all without telling us anything specific about how to honor it. 
It may be redundant because we already have principles calling for equal consideration of the 
interests of all in liberal egalitarian theories (such as those of John Rawls or Ronald Dworkin). 
When we consider those theories we may find, furthermore, that the ANP is manifestly inferior to 
them, as it does not include insights they lack and it lacks insights they have. Two examples of 
the latter insights are the account of the needs or interests that matter from the point of view of 
justice by reference to social primary goods (Rawls) or resources (Dworkin), and the 
circumstance/choice distinction that helps to establish a demarcation between inequalities that 
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deserve to be combated from the point of view of justice (those resulting from circumstances) 
and those that do not (those resulting from choice). 
 To respond to this challenge we can say several things. First, the ANP was formulated before 
the recent liberal egalitarian theories that Kymlicka mentions, and Marx already captured some of 
the insights of those theories in his discussion of the ANP. Marx, and socialists more generally, 
were worried about superficial views of equality that did not address material disadvantage. They 
demanded economic systems that actually worked equally to the benefit of all those living under 
them, challenging the absolute and relative deprivations capitalist institutions generated. In this 
respect, part of the appeal of contemporary liberal egalitarianism consists precisely in mobilizing 
socialist concerns that pre-date them. Furthermore, Marx anticipated the circumstance/choice 
distinction. As we saw, in the “Critique of the Gotha Program” Marx criticizes the Contribution 
Principle precisely because it condones inequalities in the capacity to satisfy needs which result 
from choice-independent differences in natural endowments. Arguably, the ANP captures the 
liberal egalitarian concern for responsibility if we consider both of its clauses rather than only the 
second (as Kymlicka does). The first clause identifies a responsibility to contribute, and we can 
interpret the second (as I will below) as taking the justifiability of some demands on the social 
product as depending on one’s making an appropriate effort to support its generation.  
 There is more. The ANP, and the socialist tradition, provide fresh insights about how to think 
about the metric and duties of distributive justice. They include a rich account of “abilities” and 
“needs” as being multifarious, developing over time, and as partially dependent on the nature of 
social and political systems. They include a valuable emphasis on the significance of self-
realization in work besides consumption.10 And they display a fundamental concern for solidarity 
(as captured, for example, in the responsibility to produce to meet the needs of others as 
something that has intrinsic significance). 
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 Recent liberal egalitarian theories are different from earlier liberal views of economic equality 
(which focused only on formal equality of opportunity) precisely because they have absorbed the 
historical contribution of socialism. It is liberalism that has moved toward socialist ideas. If 
contemporary socialists move toward the liberal egalitarian framework, they partly move toward 
greater understanding of their own historical contribution. As will become clear from what 
follows, I accept that there are serious problems in the Marxian formulation of the ANP. I also 
accept that contemporary socialists have much to learn from liberalism. I think that any viable 
contemporary socialist view of justice must substantially overlap with liberalism, absorbing the 
priority the latter gives to certain civil and political freedoms. But the socialist tradition has much 
to offer as well. An elaboration of the ANP can yield important insights. 
 
3.3. Need to develop an interpretation of the principle 
Despite its initial plausibility, there are important worries regarding the ANP that cannot be 
satisfactorily addressed without developing an interpretation of it. In this subsection I briefly 
identify the worries and say how we might respond to them. The rest of the paper develops these 
responses. 
(i) Beyond justice? Some say that when Marx depicts the future socialist society he assumes that 
in it there would be no serious conflict of interests or material scarcity. On this view, the ANP is 
not really a normative principle. It does not prescribe anything. Rather, it describes or predicts a 
situation beyond justice. Whether or not Marx thought this, we can entertain the ANP as a 
normative principle for situations in which the circumstances of justice do hold. 11 It may be 
unrealistic to expect that we will ever be placed in a situation in which serious problems of 
distributive justice do not arise.12 In any case, we need principles to guide our conduct in 
	   9	  
situations in which the problems exist. I will construe the ANP as at least in part a guide to 
address them. 
(ii) Appropriate metric (and issues of scarcity, disagreement, and paternalism). What needs 
should we recognize as giving rise to distributive entitlements? They must include more than 
very basic needs if the ANP is to involve more than basic sufficientarian demands (which it 
certainly does). But they cannot be equivalent to whatever people want or desire, given that 
scarcity remains. So we need a criterion of reasonable demands. This is difficult to provide given 
that people disagree about what is good, and we should beware of paternalistic impositions by 
political institutions. These problems are real. But it is important to notice that they affect any 
egalitarian view of justice. For example, advocating equality of opportunity or resources does not 
avoid them because we must determine which opportunities are worth guaranteeing politically, 
and make special provisions when equal resources yield unequal life-prospects (e.g. regarding 
health) for people with different native endowments. In 4.2, I recommend that we address these 
issues by developing a flexible yet substantive account of needs and by encouraging practices of 
democratic choice and public deliberation. 
(iii) Responsibility. How should we respond to needs that are very costly to meet when those 
having them have chosen to act in ways that foreseeably generate them? This problem is common 
in egalitarian views. I will suggest that the ANP can be sensitive to issues of responsibility. Given 
its concern with the supply side besides the demand side, it already assumes that each must be 
mindful of the effects of their choices on others. However, this will be qualified by other 
considerations. When what is stake is access to basic goods necessary for subsistence and for 
participation in the political community, needs may give rise to unconstrained distributive 
obligations.13  These points are developed in 4.1-4.3. 
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(iv) Incentives. Will people be motivated to be productive in a socialist economy? Why? This is 
another typical worry. To address it, one could engage self-centered instrumental considerations, 
making it prudent for people to support a socialist economy to avoid financial loses or the 
negative judgment or low esteem of fellow citizens. Another strategy is to cultivate a social ethos 
of solidarity and engage the intrinsic significance of self-realization in productive and meaningful 
work.14  People could organize their working activities so that they develop and exercise their 
capabilities and contribute, fraternally, to the well-being of others. It is interesting to consider the 
possible tensions between these considerations (including, for example, possible tensions 
between self-realization and solidaristic service). I develop these points in 4.3, 4.4, and 5. 
(v) Matching supply and demand. Even if the incentives problem is solved, there is the issue of 
how to make what is produced and what is needed coincide. In a large complex economy this 
poses enormous informational problems. An option is to fashion economies that retain the 
efficient signaling mechanisms of markets without their inegalitarian distributive consequences. I 
explore this strategy in 4.4. 
 
4. Developing the ANP 
4.1. The ANP is not the only principle socialists should accept 
I focus here on the ANP. But a complete account of dimension DI of socialism should also 
include other principles, and if possible identify their relations. For example, it should include 
principles of civil and political liberty, and see them as often outweighing the ANP when their 
implications conflict. If people choose jobs in which they make poor use of their productive 
abilities they should not be coerced to do other work (except in emergencies15). People should 
obey (although they may campaign for changing) distributive arrangements generated by a 
legitimate democratic process even if they are unjust according to the ANP (unless the injustices 
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are extreme). In the interpretation I will formulate, the principle is normally constrained by some 
civil and political liberties. 
 
4.2. Needs 
When we develop our views about social justice we must consider what is good for the people 
involved. Principles of equality, freedom, and solidarity can’t be given content otherwise. We 
face the questions, “Equality of what?” “Freedom to do or be what?” “Solidarity to help others 
get what?” The “what” at stake, at least in part, concerns what is good for people to do or be. 
Goods are crucial as metric, or currency, of principles of justice. This applies to the ANP. What 
needs should be recognized under this principle? Although I will not develop a full account of 
needs here, I will identify a general strategy that addresses three central questions concerning (i) 
how extensive the metric of needs should be, (ii) what kinds of items it should include, and (iii) 
how we might respond to worries about paternalism. 
(i) Extensiveness. How expansive should be the metrics of needs? It could be said that 
distributing according to needs involves some austere threshold of sufficiency. But since we are 
trying to articulate the Marxian ideal, which is concerned with human flourishing, we should not 
think about needs in this way. The relevant contrast should not be between needs and non-urgent 
wants. It should be between real and non-real, merely apparent interests or goods. The ANP 
ranges over real interests in human flourishing. So the metric can be fairly expansive, without a 
fixed threshold, and such that having more is often better than having less. The Marxian view that 
needs and abilities do, and should, develop and increase over time speaks in favor of this 
interpretation. 16 The focus, I suggest, should be on enabling the highest feasible level of need 
satisfaction that can be reasonably achieved at any given time.17 
(ii) Needs, capabilities, and self-realization. A fruitful strategy for identifying the relevant needs, 
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in a certain context, is to focus on certain valuable capabilities of agents in that context. The 
needs would be constituted by what the agents require to develop and exercise those capabilities. 
The more the agents develop and exercise those capabilities, the more they can be said to achieve 
a flourishing life. A generalized version of this strategy has been recently provided by the 
capability approach proposed by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum.18 I think that this approach 
is helpful for articulating the ANP.  
 We can account for people’s needs by considering what would constitute their capabilities to 
engage in certain valuable “functionings” (i.e. certain ways of being or doing they have reason to 
value). Marx’s view of socialism as securing the conditions for people’s self-realization, itself 
construed as the development and exercise of various capabilities, can indeed be seen as a case of 
the capabilitarian strategy. In particular, the emphasis on autonomous and cooperative capability 
development and exercise at the workplace is a distinctive contribution of the socialist tradition to 
the capability metric.19 
 There are two kinds of work in Marx’s view: work that merely secures subsistence and work 
that involves the extensive development and expression of workers’ various capabilities. The 
second is the kind of work that includes self-realization. It involves activities in which workers 
cooperate with each other as equals, have powers to choose what to do and how to do it, and 
develop and exercise skills through interesting, challenging, and enjoyable performances. It is the 
opposite of alienated labor, which involves dull or distressful tasks and servile or hostile 
relationships.20 Now, these two kinds of work are respectively picked out in two common 
interpretations of the significance of work in Marx’s view of socialism, the “higher form of 
society … in which the full and free development of every individual forms the ruling 
principle”.21 One interpretation draws on Marx’s contrast between the “realm of freedom” and 
the “realm of necessity,” which seems to locate all work in the latter, and envisions self-
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realization as occurring outside of it.22 The other invokes Marx’s characterization of work as 
“life’s prime want”.23 Here self-realization in work is a primary achievement of socialism.  
 Arguably both forms of work are important, although in different ways. Access to work 
involving self-realization should count as one of the needs satisfied in socialism. As described in 
the previous paragraph, it strikes me as an intrinsically significant good. If the design of a just 
society is to focus not only on distributing the outputs of an economic process but also on its 
internal shape, it should have room for work of this kind. On the other hand, a duty to do one’s 
fair share regarding some forms of instrumentally necessary but not intrinsically desirable work 
is obviously part of what a duty to contribute according to one’s abilities should include. 
 Of course, there are needs that go beyond work. Needs regarding consumption goods and the 
pursuit of intimate relationships are clear examples. When it comes to those Marx’s framework is 
often limited, and we must look elsewhere. 24 Recent work in the capability approach provides 
excellent ideas concerning what further categories of needs and associated capabilities we should 
explore.25  
 The capability approach emphasizes various dimensions of freedom. It recommends that we 
foster people’s positive freedom to develop and exercise various capabilities.26 Second, it 
commands respect for people’s choices by not forcing them to engage in any specific 
functionings. Finally, it gives especial importance to political liberties (such as voting, 
organizing, protesting, deliberating) that enable people to identify, try, contest, and revise 
political accounts of important capabilities and distributive schemes supporting them. I want to 
stress the limits, and importance, of this last point.  
 In a deliberative democracy, people can reasonably develop and revise their own views of 
what needs should be socially supported. But we should not conflate democratic procedures of 
choice and substantive criteria about what needs deserve to be supported. Thus, for example, 
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Geras considers the problem of identifying a “standard of reasonableness” of needs (given that 
we should avoid accounts that are too minimal—they are undesirable—and too maximal—they 
are infeasible).27 He entertains three options: unilateral imposition by a state-type body, a 
standard that emerges spontaneously without reflection, and social norms agents come to agree 
upon. He says, plausibly, that the third option is the best. But notice that his discussion moved 
from substantive to procedural issues. Some might say that we should adopt a constructivist view 
here and think that how distributive schemes are chosen provides the conditions that make them 
right. I find this suggestion intuitively problematic because it is liable to a version of the powerful 
Euthyphro question: Is a distributive decision right because we make it, or should we make it 
because it is right? And, independently of the truth or falsity of constructivism, procedural 
principles do not provide substantive guidance as we try to think lucidly about what to propose, 
criticize, and agree to in a public debate about needs if we join it.  
 The questions “What is the politically legitimate procedure for deciding what needs will be 
met?” and “What are the correct entitlements of need?” are different. The reference to democratic 
liberties answers the first question without necessarily settling the second. Despite this limitation, 
we should recognize the great importance of democratic liberties for the implementation of the 
ANP. First, these liberties are intrinsically valuable: their recognition involves respect for 
people’s capabilities for political judgment and self-determination. Second, their use is 
instrumentally significant: people can enhance their knowledge about what needs are important 
by testing and correcting their political beliefs in public debate. Third, they are also 
instrumentally valuable by enabling people to keep accountable others whose political choices 
affect their needs. Thus, even if the standard of reasonable needs is independent, democratic 
liberties are important for discovering and applying its contents in autonomous, reliable, and 
effective ways. This is why we have a strong pro tanto reason to organize the implementation of 
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the ANP so that we support the needs recognized through democratic processes of debate and 
decision-making. 
(iii) Paternalism. Since the ANP is meant to track capabilities for human flourishing, it clearly 
goes beyond anything like basic needs, and we can say that it concerns important interests more 
generally. But wouldn’t social policy centered on some interpretation of these interests be 
unconscionably paternalistic? 
 There are two immediate and important responses to this worry. The first is that, as we saw, 
the application of the ANP is to proceed within a framework of democratic deliberation and 
choice. The presence of this framework limits the extent to which agents are subject to standards 
they do not themselves accept. They may, of course, be part of a minority. But the second 
response addresses this case. The distributive focus is on securing certain real opportunities or 
capabilities, not their exercise. Everybody has a civil liberty against being forced to engage in a 
specific functioning judged good by others when they prefer not to do so. 28  
 It might be objected that in a social scheme implementing the ANP people’s liberty is unduly 
limited because the generation of the selected opportunities is costly, and everyone is made to 
pay for it whether they use them or not. However, the imposition is justified if all feasible social 
schemes have consequences in terms of promoting and limiting opportunities. If our normative 
assessment of schemes is sensitive to consequences on people’s opportunities to live flourishing 
lives (as it should), and different feasible schemes promote different opportunity profiles, then we 
should (other things being equal) support the scheme with the best feasible consequences overall. 
It may include some opportunities that not everyone uses. But their presence is important to those 
who do use them, and it enhances the effective freedom of those who don’t by offering them real 
options to choose from. Furthermore, and to repeat, the scheme would be constrained by strong 
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civil and political liberties which entitle people to refrain from using, and empower them to 
challenge and change, existing opportunity profiles. 
 Some might suggest that we deflate anxiety about paternalism by adopting a less controversial, 
sufficientarian reading of the ANP according to which we should empower people to meet their 
most urgent, or basic needs. But why not embrace a more ambitious ideal that targets equal 
opportunities to the highest levels of well-being that are reasonably feasible? After all, is it not 
unfair that some people can flourish less than others through no choice or fault of their own? If 
we secure civil and political liberties, why not pursue the more ambitious project? The reminder 
of this section develops this project further. 
 
4.3. The demands of the ANP 
In this subsection I propose an interpretation of the demands of the ANP. I also explore how it 
relates to important socialist concerns about alienation and exploitation, and helps respond to 
worries regarding individuals’ responsibility and their different personal needs and choices 
concerning self-realization, consumption, and leisure.  
 Regarding the first task, I suggest that we understand the ANP as involving a set of demands 
on the organization of a system of economic cooperation. Its point is to call for an organization of 
economic activity that is egalitarian, solidaristic, and sensitive to difference. The organization is 
egalitarian because in it everyone’s level of burden and benefit matters equally. It is solidaristic 
because with it agents express their commitment to taking each person’s capacity to flourish as an 
end. And it is sensitive to difference because it enables people to pursue their well-being in ways 
that are appropriate given their own singular characteristics. These demands, combined, should 
shape the economic system. Both parts of the principle (from each according to their abilities, to 
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each according to their needs) should be simultaneously operative. What are the demands? At 
least the following five are crucial:  
(a) Opportunities for self-realization in work: There should be effective opportunities for 
productive activity that involves self-realization rather than alienation. Workers should be free 
to choose whether they take one of them, and which one. The available activities would foster 
the development and actualization of workers’ productive capabilities, give them powers of 
management, and enable them to cooperate with other workers. These opportunities would be 
effective in that mechanisms would be in place to offset morally arbitrary differences between 
workers that affect their accessibility. For example, excellent education and training would be 
available to all, and the workplace would be designed so that workers with different talents and 
bodily restrictions can thrive. These opportunities for activity involving self-realization would 
meet a human need to engage in it. 
(b) Positive duties: There should be a social ethos and institutions articulating positive duties to 
produce to meet other people’s needs. Each should envisage some reasonable level of 
development and use of their powers to produce in this way. 
(c) Securing basic needs: Some instantiations of the positive duties mentioned in (b) which 
concern the satisfaction of basic needs for subsistence and for being able to function as a 
political equal have especial urgency, and should be given great weight. 
(d) Fair reciprocity: There should be an ethos and a scheme of distribution of access to 
consumption goods that recognizes a responsibility to cooperate in production on terms of fair 
reciprocity. Nobody should take advantage of cooperative efforts of others without making their 
own, similar effort if they can. Similar effort is not equivalence in output (which might depend 
on morally arbitrary differences in native endowments), but a matter of the proportion of 
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contribution given one’s abilities.29 Those (but only those) who make an equal effort (when they 
can) should have equal access to consumption goods. 
(e) Sensitivity to individual differences: Individual differences in abilities and needs are 
normatively important. The assessment of levels of contribution should be mindful of 
differences in ability. And people should be able to pursue their well-being in ways that are 
appropriate given their own singular characteristics. For example, they should be able to make 
their own choices concerning self-realization, consumption, and leisure. 
I add two further components to this proposal, which qualify the foregoing demands: 
(f) Limited ideal: The demands mentioned in (a)-(e) are limited. It is not expected that people’s 
productive contribution will be maximal, that all their important human abilities will be 
developed and actualized in production, that all of their needs will be fully met, or that every 
important individual difference will be honored. The requirement is, in each case, to achieve an 
arrangement that is feasible and reasonable (i.e. one whose requirements can be met and do not 
involve unjustifiable sacrifices—given individuals’ personal prerogative to cater for their own 
needs—when compared to the feasible alternatives). 
(g) Democratic control: The design of the basic outlines of the economic system (such as the 
control of means of production, the coordination between productive units, the existence and 
rules of markets, and the schemes of taxation and subsidies) should be subject to authorization, 
contestation, and change by all the members of society through democratic mechanisms of 
opinion- and will-formation. 
As I said in 4.1, the goal of framing an economic system so that it fulfills the ANP should be 
weighed against other normative pro tanto considerations that will often be stronger, such as the 
protection of civil and political rights and their fair value. My formulation of the demands 
associated with the principle incorporates aspects of those liberties, such as the freedom from 
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forced labor in (a) and certain democratic political rights affecting the design of economic 
institutions and practices in (g). Notice also that the sufficientarian principle of support for the 
provision of certain basic needs (health care, education, etc.) that are necessary for subsistence 
and effective citizenship is included in component (c). These considerations could also be seen as 
separate requirements that weigh against a more narrow formulation of the demands of the ANP. 
Conceived in this way, the ANP captures the typically socialist normative concerns for need-
satisfaction, non-alienation and non-exploitation. The first two concerns are captured in the 
shaping of the productive process as including effective opportunities for self-realization in work 
and the duty to help produce objects that can be used to meet needs. The concern for non-
exploitation is partly captured by the standard of fair reciprocity. I will elaborate these points by 
suggesting that their articulation avoids pitfalls in other interpretations of the ideas captured. 
First, consider non-exploitation of workers. Component (d) captures the relational wrong of 
taking advantage of the efforts of others without appropriate reciprocation. This contrasts with a 
libertarian construal of exploitation, and with a view that sees its significance as derivative from 
the distribution of economic assets. The former sees the wrongness of exploitation as a matter of 
depriving workers of the product of their labor (to which they are entitled). The latter sees it as a 
symptom of the unjust inequality in control of means of production, which gives capitalists more 
bargaining power than workers. 
The principle of entitlement to the product of one’s labor is problematic because it makes it 
unjust to impose the redistribution of some of it to meet the basic needs of those who cannot 
work. It thus violates component (c) of the account, which for example requires the provision of 
basic resources to those who cannot work because they are infirm. The principle also prohibits 
redistribution to those who work but are (because of having less natural talent) less productive 
despite exerting similar effort. We should then seek to construe the wrongness of exploitation in a 
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different way.30 The proposal presented here can help. An intuition that seems to support the 
entitlement principle is that when workers have made an effort and bore costs to produce 
something, they have a prima facie claim to commensurate rewards.31 The force of this intuition 
can be captured by the requirement of fair response to the efforts of others in (d). The crucial idea 
behind the condemnation of exploitation is that there is a duty to avoid taking unfair advantage of 
others. In my interpretation, the ANP encodes an ideal of non-exploitation: we should not take 
advantage of need satisfying activities by others that benefit us without doing our share in 
producing advantages that can meet needs of others when we can. If we can do our share and we 
don’t, and we receive from others who do their share, then we exploit them. (d) is an ideal of 
reciprocity in cooperation, according to which everyone should put corresponding levels of effort 
if they can when they benefit from the effort of others. Furthermore, since the proposed account 
includes (b) and (c), it also makes reference to positive duties to support others, which provides a 
key consideration missing in, and threatened by, the libertarian view. Notice that (b) and (c) need 
not conflict with (d): the needy that cannot work and are helped do not engage in unfair 
advantage-taking. A conflict may arise, however, if some make claims on the work of others 
without working when they can. I address this case below. 
The second view of exploitation mentioned above captures the important points that unequal 
control of means of production affects bargaining power, and is in any case unfair given that 
nobody should start their life as economic agents with fewer external productive assets than 
others. Now notice, first, that we can take the ANP to generate this judgment given its egalitarian 
profile as described in the second paragraph of this subsection. Alternatively, of course, we could 
see it as a theorem of an independent, “luck-egalitarian” principle. Furthermore, the issues could 
partly be handled through the democratic process envisioned in (g). Such process could yield 
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collective control of means of production, or severe restrictions on private control to shape 
bargaining conditions appropriately.  
Second, the view under discussion misses the specific relational wrong involved in 
exploitation. Initial inequality of resources enables this wronging, but does not fully account for 
what constitutes it. The account of positive duties and fair reciprocity proposed here can partly 
explain what is missing. The problem with the exploitation of workers by capitalists, for 
example, is not only that their initial unequal access to means of production is unfair. There is 
also the problem that some (the capitalists) use their superior bargaining power to get others (the 
workers) to benefit them disproportionately, instead of creating cooperative ventures that equally 
support all those who make similar efforts within them. The proposal advanced here also partly 
explains the possible wrongs involved in relations between people who start with, or currently 
have, equal access to means of production. Their differences in natural endowments (intelligence, 
vigor, charisma, creativity, etc.) may by themselves make their bargaining power unequal, and 
this inequality may enable the better endowed to shape economic interactions so that they gain 
disproportionately from them. Outcomes of this sort involve some agents taking unfair advantage 
of the relative weakness of others. A social ethos and institutions of solidarity and fair reciprocity 
of the kind envisaged in (b) and (d) would require that they be avoided.32 
 Let me add a final comment regarding component (d). As I interpret the ANP, it does not 
involve a complete severing of the link between work and distributive entitlements.33 That 
severance might make sense if we assume lack of material scarcity or ignore that goods for 
consumption are the result of productive efforts by people. As long as there is scarcity, some 
things that people need will not be readily available. If workers have freedom of occupation (as 
they should), and they can be more or less productive, then certain needs can be more or less 
satisfied depending on how much people choose to work. In this context, it seems problematic 
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when a person makes claims on scarce consumption goods without having contributed to the 
economic process by using their abilities. The problem would be one of fairness toward those 
who have contributed but will receive less because of the lower economic input resulting from 
others’ lack of contribution.34 
 This conditionality does not make the ANP a version of the Contribution Principle, however. 
In circumstances of scarcity, the former, like the latter, is sensitive to contributive efforts.35 But 
components (e), (b), and (a) make the ANP a different principle. Thus, it recommends that we 
take individual differences into account when we appraise contribution and needs. Furthermore, 
labor-contribution is not the ground of the duty to expand others’ access to consumption goods, 
but a condition on generalized support in circumstances of relative scarcity. Needs are still what 
primarily gives rise to economic duties.36 Finally, of course, in my interpretation the ANP 
involves a distinctive concern with self-realization, to which I now turn. 
The ideal of self-realization (or non-alienation) is obviously catered for by component (a) of 
the proposal presented here. The socialist view that economic systems should incorporate 
opportunities for self-realization in work has been subject to challenge, however. Some have 
argued that a conception of justice appealing to self-realization in work might arbitrarily 
disregard other goods or preferences concerning consumption, leisure, or the cultivation of 
personal relationships.37 Why not let people work less if this gives them more time to devote 
themselves to leisure and personal relationships, or work in ways that do not involve self-
realization if this gives them more income for consumption? This is an important challenge. But 
the view presented here can answer it. 
 First, it is important to note that where there are time constraints, material scarcity, and 
multiple desiderata, any economic system will force people to make tradeoffs between various 
goods. So the issue is what system offers the best balance overall, and whether it gives people 
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real options and conditions of autonomy to choose from them. Capitalist societies fail badly in 
these respects. Economic necessity forces many people to work long hours in unsatisfying jobs 
for low salaries. Second, as presented in (a), work involving self-realization is an opportunity, not 
an obligation. Other forms of work are not banned. What is crucial is that workers are treated 
fairly by being given real alternatives to unfulfilling work. Third, even including opportunities 
for self-realization, the length of standard full-time work can be reduced. As per (g), citizens 
shaping the rules of their economic system can impose that reduction to free up time for other 
activities. Fourth, self-realization can also be pursued outside of productive work. Affirming the 
ANP does not require denying the importance of those other goods, or blocking their pursuit. 
Finally, given its component (e) demanding proper responses to individual differences, this 
proposal would support personal prerogatives for people to judge how to balance the multiple 
opportunities and obligations they face. As acknowledged in (f), the desideratum of self-
realization is limited.38 
 Still, production has a central significance as a general enabler of pretty much every activity. 
In any economy that is not fully automated, work will have to occur if subsistence and 
opportunities for human flourishing (inside and outside the workplace) are to be extensive. Any 
society will have to encourage through various mechanisms that people work. It is only sensible 
that societies accompany this demand with policies that shape a significant number of 
opportunities to work in ways that enable self-realization.39 
 
4.4. Implementing the ANP 
I have been developing an interpretation of the ANP that addresses the puzzles identified in 3.3. 
My discussion has proceeded at a fairly abstract level to focus on dimension DI of the socialist 
ideal. Of course, much more should be said, but I hope I have showed that the principle is worth 
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taking seriously. But what about dimensions DII and DIII? I will tackle DIII in section 5. In the 
remainder of this section, I will address DII by refining what to my knowledge is the only 
detailed proposal of an economic system that implements the ANP. I will identify the main points 
in Joseph Carens’s proposal40 and then suggest some amendments. 
(i) Aims. Carens seeks a way to make equality compatible with freedom and efficiency. His 
proposed implementation of the ANP achieve this by mobilizing the freedom of choice and the 
informational virtues of markets without the motivational and distributive features they display in 
capitalist societies. By doing this, Carens addresses several of the problems mentioned in 3.3, 
including, notably, those concerning incentives and the matching of production and demand. 
(ii) Full implementation. Carens proposes implementations of both parts of the ANP. The “for 
each according to need” part is implemented via two requirements: equal post-tax income for all 
and direct provision targeting “differentially incurred needs” (such as special health care needs). 
The “from each according to ability” part is implemented via requiring from each person who can 
work (and only from them) that they take a full-time job and make good use of their talents in it. 
People are free to choose whether, where, and how much to work. They are not legally coerced to 
work. There is, however, a social expectation, a recognized social duty, that they work full-time 
and choose lines of work that are socially beneficial. People are not expected to choose jobs that 
maximize their level of contribution.41 They have a personal prerogative such that they may 
choose not to take up jobs they hate. It is up to them to strike an appropriate balance between 
their social duty and other considerations that are important to them. 
(iii) Social ethos. An economy that implements the principle is efficient because in it there is a 
strong social ethos such that people voluntarily choose to fulfill their social duty. It includes 
markets as we know them insofar as different pre-tax incomes vary signaling the extent of social 
demand for different economic activities. But the distributive function of markets disappears, as 
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after-tax income is the same for all. People use these signals to identify where to contribute with 
their ability. By doing it even if they will not get more after-tax income than others they enact 
their ethical choice to fulfill the social duty to produce to equally support the needs of all. The 
incentive for people to work hard is moral, not pecuniary. People develop this strong sense of 
solidarity through socialization and through experiencing the benefits of living in a socialist 
society that affirms the equal importance of everyone’s well-being. 
(iv) Fairness and freedom. Finally, Carens addresses possible complaints about how this proposal 
honors ideals of fairness and freedom. Regarding fairness, he says that the socialist principle 
draws on an intuitively appealing idea of sharing the burdens of cooperation in proportion to our 
abilities (all should do their part, but the part each should do depends on what they can do, so 
that, for example, if we are moving stones from one place to another, if you are stronger than me 
you should carry heavier ones). He considers the worry that his approach is insensitive to the 
need to offer compensation to those whose work imposes greater hardships, or prefer to work less 
and devote themselves more to leisure, or prefer to work longer for a higher income to consume 
more. Carens recognizes that his proposal does not necessarily yield exactly equal access to 
conditions of well-being for all. But he retorts that in practice we cannot find a generally agreed 
upon and reliable way to balance all these considerations. Central planning systems and capitalist 
market economies would likely do worse. For example, the former would be seriously deficient 
at tracking demand, and in the latter higher salaries would often track relative scarcity of certain 
talents, not burdensomeness of the work done. Although he acknowledges that his scheme is not 
perfect, Carens says that all things considered it is “the best we can do.”  
   Regarding freedom, Carens considers the complaint that the social duty to produce according to 
ability is too demanding, leaving people too little room for doing what they want without facing 
social pressure. In response, he says that overall effective freedom is in fact comparatively 
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maximized in his socialist economy. In a capitalist economy many people have fewer 
consumption options outside of work (given their lower income). His proposal does not force 
anyone to work, and it recognizes a personal prerogative so that people are morally entitled to 
choose jobs they enjoy rather than hate. This option is not always really available in capitalist 
economies, where people are forced by circumstances to take jobs they hate to pay for food and 
housing and other basic necessities. The socialist ethos would not be too confining. Furthermore, 
we should not think that other systems, including capitalism, do not secrete constraining social 
expectations of their own. 
 Carens’s impressive proposal provides the best starting point to explore the implementation of 
the ANP. In what follows, I introduce some critical comments and propose some amendments. 
(i) Principles and implementation. Carens sometimes confuses the dimensions of principles (DI) 
and of implementation through specific institutions and practices (DII). For example, to say that 
it is difficult to find a publicly shared and reliable way to identify what is important for different 
people in terms of their relative packages of work satisfaction, consumption, and leisure may be a 
reason not to mention specific packages in the institutional implementation of a principle of 
distribution according to need, but is not itself an objection to seeing that principle as sensitive to 
these interpersonal variations. Other things being equal, if (and to the extent that) we could track 
those variations in an appropriate way, then surely we should introduce schemes that offer the 
right combination to each person. 
(ii) Fairness in tracking diverse evaluations of work, consumption, and leisure. At the level of 
implementation of the demand to cater equally for the needs of all, we can add to the two policies 
proposed by Carens (equal post-tax income for all and direct public provision regarding 
differentially incurred needs). I suggest three additions. First, since people are expected to spend 
a lot of time working, we may shape some workplaces so that those who care about having 
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managerial power and self-realization in work have opportunities to enjoy them.42 Second, since 
some people may especially value leisure, or consumption, more than others, we could organize 
the economic system so that to accrue a certain set level of equal income people have to work a 
certain number of hours (the standard full-time workload). Those who want to have access to 
more money to consume more can work longer hours and get a higher salary, and those who want 
more leisure can work fewer hours and get a lower salary. The social ethos can be shaped so that 
people have a duty to work, should work full-time if they want equal salaries at the set level, but 
are free to work more if they want to consume more or less if they want more leisure. With these 
clear guidelines, everyone could see the scheme as fair. These modifications help service 
demands articulated in 4.3. They provide cases in which, through exercise of the democratic 
control envisaged in component (g), we can affirm positive duties to cater for the needs of all 
(component b), provide opportunities for self-realization in work (component a), and recognize 
diverse needs concerning work, leisure, and consumption (component e).43 
 A third amendment conflicts with a feature of Carens’s view as formulated in Equality, Moral 
Incentives and the Market.44 Carens does not take an individual’s access to their equal income 
share to be legally (as different from ethically) conditional upon their actually working (full-time 
or at all). This of course gives rise to the objection that the Carensian scheme would unravel due 
to free-riding tendencies. Carens responds that it is unlikely that many people would choose not 
to work, or work very little, because of the social pressure they would suffer from others, and 
their own sense of shame and guilt. I don’t know if this speculative prediction is justified. But in 
any case it does not seem wrong, when the problem of free-riding is real, to introduce legal 
conditionality in the system.45 Two further points would make this amendment stronger by 
linking it to other desiderata mentioned above. First, the equal income rule could be made not 
only conditional upon people working but also sensitive to the number of hours worked, to allow 
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work schedules that go above or below the standard full-time one (as discussed in the previous 
paragraph). So equality remains in that all those working the same number of hours would get the 
same income, but different egalitarian profiles could arise reflecting people’s free choice to work 
more or less. This would give people the opportunity to fulfill different preferences regarding 
leisure and consumption while retaining the egalitarian spirit of the proposal. It would also 
service the concern for reciprocity which free-riding violates. Thus amended, the Carensian 
scheme can better service components (b), (d), and (e) of the interpretation of the ANP proposed 
in 4.3. A second point should be added to avoid outcomes that are too onerous, and thus to cater 
for component (c). Everyone, regardless of whether they work or how much they work, would 
have access to a basic level of income and services. This would secure everyone’s basic needs 
and general conditions of citizenship.46 
(iii) Role of government. I share Carens’s rejection of a centrally planned economy, and his 
skepticism about government bureaucrats being able to make accurate fine-grained assessments 
of diverse people’s needs. But we should not exaggerate. 47 Even in Carens’s scheme, the 
government has to make controversial decisions about what are the “differentially incurred 
needs” that are to be serviced directly, and what to do to respond to them. It also has to determine 
the length of a standard workload (how many hours a worker has to work to qualify as working 
“full-time” and thus be morally entitled to receive equal post-tax income). This is bound to be 
controversial too, and it already involves evaluative tradeoffs concerning the value of 
consumption and leisure, for example. Carens acknowledges that there would be controversial 
choices here, but says that they would be subject to democratic debate and choice. Now, the same 
can be said about the policies I suggest. They do not involve a fully centrally planned economy. 
They recognize that government has a role in securing a fair, level playing field for workers 
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without imposing a narrow (and harmful) focus on income and consumption, as Carens’s regime 
ends up in fact having. And they are framed by democratic procedures (as per (g)). 
 Even if we have a reasonable picture of what would render the implementation of the ANP 
workable and stable, we still have to explore how such an implementation might be feasible in 
terms of accessibility.48 I now turn to this issue. 
 
5. Transition  
We considered how socialism could be construed at dimensions DI and DII by entertaining an 
interpretation of the ANP and an amended version of the Carensian implementation. But how can 
we move from here to there? How is a socialist economy realizing the ANP accessible from the 
current capitalist one? This is the question of transition pertaining to DIII. It gives rise to many 
issues about the relation between feasibility and justice in general,49 and about the achievability 
of socialism in particular.50 In this section I concentrate on the specific issue of how the current 
capitalist ethos could be transformed into the socialist one oriented by the ANP. An immediate 
answer is that people can become motivated to honor that principle by being socialized in 
families, schools, and economic institutions that subject them to expectations based in it. This 
answer is helpful, but does not go far enough. We have to figure out how a generation of people 
may arise that choose to socialize new generations in this way for the first time. 
 As we saw (in section 2), Marx did not propose the ANP as the immediate target for social 
reorganization. Instead, he suggested that we start by implementing the Contribution Principle 
(hereafter “CP”). The latter generates an incentive centered on self-advancement, and does not 
(beyond provision for basic needs) incorporate a wide positive duty to produce to meet the needs 
of others who cannot produce as much as oneself. Marx had thus a two-stage view of socialist 
transition. Is a view like this plausible? I will advance three reflections. The first two introduce 
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puzzles concerning the two-stage structure of transition. I do not fully solve them, but I articulate 
considerations that are fruitful to address them. My last reflection is more positive. It suggests 
that we deploy the powerful idea of human dignity to increase the ANP’s motivational traction. 
(i) Immediate vs. deferred approximation. The first puzzle concerns the issue whether the CP and 
the ANP work as maximal approximations of the same key ideals in different contexts or as a 
teleologically articulated sequence where only the final stage enacts the ideals. On the first 
interpretation, the CP is as far as we can go in the early stage of socialism, and the ANP states 
how far we can go later on (which is a lot further, arguably all the way). There are some 
underlying ideals (concerning well-being, self-realization, freedom, equality, solidarity, etc.) that 
are common. Each principle identifies the contextually maximal approximation that is feasible in 
each phase.  
 On the second interpretation, the CP is not implemented because it provides the maximal 
approximation immediately available, but because it helps (1) complete the transition away from 
capitalism and (2) create the conditions for the introduction of the higher phase of socialism. It is 
only in the latter that a real approximation to the ideals occurs. In the early phase, what is crucial 
is (1) and (2). First, we ensure that we leave capitalism behind. This is done by finally fulfilling a 
key promise which capitalism makes but violates. Capitalism is often justified through the ideal 
of exchange of equivalents, but in it workers give more than they get, and capitalists get more 
than they give. By contrast, in the early phase of socialism framed by the CP, each gets in 
proportion to what they give. This pattern would motivate those who endorse the ideal of 
exchange of equivalents to move from capitalism to the early phase of socialism, and to not to go 
back. Second, the fulfillment of the CP gives people a strong incentive to work (as they would be 
rewarded in proportion to how much they work). They would thus create the great material 
abundance that is necessary for the socialist ideals to be really approximated in the higher phase. 
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 The two interpretations motivate an interesting general puzzle for sequential pictures of 
transformation in which different principles are recommended for different stages. They involve 
two different rationales for selecting principles in the first stage of the two-stage sequence. The 
interesting issue arises because the two rationales may conflict. It could be that if we follow the 
first rationale (and maximize approximation to the constant ideals in each stage), then we might 
choose social realizations that are not optimal for enabling the following stage in the sequence. 
Path-dependence could set in, with a local maximum that does not lead to the global maximum.51 
People socialized in the value of exchange of equivalents may not want to move to a society in 
which that principle is dropped. There is then the option of going for the second rationale (and 
choose what would maximize the chances of eventually moving to the situation in which the 
constant ideals could find their maximal approximation overall). But then there is the moral 
problem of choosing social organizations for the first stage that are harmful to people, or not as 
good as they could be at the time. The worse the situation in the early phase of transition, the 
worse (other things equal) this strategy is. Things get even more problematic when the 
calculation of what is necessary or most likely to produce the conditions for the higher phase is 
uncertain. Why take the step backward when it is not certain that this would enable us to take the 
envisioned two steps forward? The more uncertainty, the worse (other things being equal) this 
strategy is. These problems would be mitigated (but not dissolved) if people apply these 
strategies through their own democratic choice. 
(ii) Inclusion vs. contradiction. Another puzzle when determining how to proceed regarding the 
two stages is this. We have to consider two possible valences of the first stage in relation to the 
second: (1) the first involves a less extensive realization of the relevant ideals than the second 
(inclusion); (2) the first violates the ideals realized in the second (contradiction). The early stage 
of socialism, by comparison to the higher stage, exemplifies both (1) and (2). The 
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implementation of the CP is accompanied with the requirement that basic needs be met, and it 
increases overall resources available to expand people’s well-being beyond basic needs. This is a 
case of (1). It could be said that to implement the CP is to partially implement the ANP: 
distribution according to contribution gives people part of what they need, and the part of it that 
they can feasibly get in the early stage of transition. But it condones inequalities of access to 
means of consumption (and well-being more generally) that result from morally arbitrary 
differences (such as differences in native endowments and in social circumstances).52 This is a 
case of (2). 
  It could be asked: Since the implementation of the CP involves a case of (2), why not adopt 
another transitional principle? For example, Jon Elster suggests that a better pragmatic choice in 
the early stage is some version of Rawls’s Difference Principle (which accepts only those 
inequalities that work to the maximum benefit of the worst-off—or, in a weaker version, make 
the worst-off better off).53 Elster might be right, but we should not ignore the problem of 
feasibility that Marx is addressing. As we saw, the CP involves some continuity with the 
bourgeois moral culture that is being targeted for transformation (the principle of exchange of 
equivalents is consistently applied), whereas the Difference Principle seems more remote. In fact, 
Rawls himself acknowledges that it is quite a radical departure from the status quo.54 If this is 
true, then it might be a good idea to explore a three-stage schedule of principles: the CP, the 
Difference Principle, and the ANP. The second would be introduced as the inequalities in access 
to consumption goods resulting from morally arbitrary differences in productive capacity 
condoned by the first become ethically and politically salient, and the third would be introduced 
once the incentive problems that the second addresses become less pressing. As material scarcity 
is reduced, these changes in moral culture might succeed.  
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 It is important that in its weak version the Difference Principle is not the final destination. It 
involves a relatively weak version of fraternity. Rawls thinks it expresses fraternity as “the idea 
of not wanting to have greater advantages unless this is to the benefit of others who are less well 
off”.55  But we can envisage a stronger form of fraternity that involves more than consoling the 
worse off by enabling them to have more than they had before we came to have more that we had 
before. We can also wonder whether we should want to have more than them (rather than share 
the new advantages we can help bring about, equally, with them) to begin with. The ANP 
involves a more exigent, and egalitarian form of solidarity. (It is interesting, however, to consider 
how it compares with the strong version of the Difference Principle, which calls for 
maximization of the condition of the worst-off but does not require equality.) 
 Interestingly, Rawls himself considers whether Marx could have adopted the Difference 
Principle instead of the CP, but judges that he would have rejected it because of his left-
libertarian commitments. Those commitments require equality of access to external productive 
resources, but beyond that they prohibit involuntary transfers from more to less advantaged 
producers. The Difference Principle would coercively impose such redistributions.56 I think that 
Rawls’s interpretation is defective. There may be a left-libertarian strand in Marx, but it is absent 
in the “Critique of the Gotha Program.” In this text, the CP is accompanied by requirements to 
provide health care and education for all and support for those who cannot work. Marx says that 
those services will expand as the socialist transition deepens. These redistributions involve 
enforceable positive duties to help others. They are incompatible with libertarianism.  
(iii) Human dignity and the move from exchange of equivalents to mutual affirmation.57 The 
inspiring idea of human dignity is central to (at least) modern moral and political culture. Its core 
is that human beings are owed forms of respect and concern that show proper appreciation of 
their valuable capacities. As agents capable of sentience, theoretical and practical reasoning, 
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aesthetic appreciation, creative labor, and social cooperation (amongst other basic capacities), 
human beings should be granted rights to what they need to develop and exercise these capacities 
in their social life. Human rights identify the most urgent claims of human dignity.58 Social 
justice, including economic justice, goes further, recognizing that human dignity gives rise to 
equal entitlements to the conditions for leading a flourishing life, not only a decent one. 
 Acting on the ANP involves a double affirmation of producers and receivers of products. 
Receivers are affirmed because their consumption-needs are seen as intrinsically significant: it is 
worth working to meet them. Producers are also affirmed, as production makes available 
activities in which their capabilities for self-direction and for cooperative and creative labor are 
developed and exercised. When multiple agents honor the principle in their economic relations, 
the double affirmation is reciprocal and general.59 An economy becomes a system of mutual 
affirmation in which each participant’s well-being and autonomy are equally significant. In this 
economy, the human dignity of each is respected, as the free pursuit of well-being of each in 
production and consumption is protected. In addition, human dignity is seen as giving rise to 
positive duties of solidaristic support. To show concern besides respect for the human dignity of 
others we must help promote, not just refrain from hampering, the conditions in which they can 
flourish. Socialism takes the abilities and needs of all as the focus of negative and positive duties. 
As a result, it gives human dignity full recognition. 
 The socialist outlook of mutual affirmation, involving both negative and positive duties, goes 
beyond the ethos of capitalism, which involves widespread selfishness. In capitalist economic 
life, the needs of others are normally relevant for me only if, and to the extent that, catering for 
them would work to my own advantage. This attitude does not take the dignity of other human 
beings seriously. The idea of exchange of equivalents is also problematically self-centered. Why 
should we think that individuals are not entitled to objects whose exchange value is higher than 
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the exchange value of the objects they themselves produce? This ignores the intrinsic significance 
of their needs, and the mutual affirmation that solidarity embodies. The idea of exchange of 
equivalents gets whatever appeal it has from its association to the idea of fair reciprocity. But fair 
reciprocity is an altogether different idea, which is captured by the ANP. It requires mutuality in 
productive effort we are able to exert, not that only identical exchange values be swapped. 
 The socialist Abilities/Needs Principle gives human dignity its due. However, this point is 
obscured by a common, ideological construal of human dignity. On that construal, getting 
support from others is a source of humiliation or shame, and giving it involves arrogance or guilt. 
This is an ideological outlook because it twists the idea of dignity to reproduce existing relations 
of inequality, exploitation, and indifference. Once we move beyond conditions of severe scarcity, 
the injustice of these relations cannot be ignored, and the inspiring call for the mutual affirmation 
of our human dignity may finally gain the motivational traction it deserves.60 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The principle was formulated in Karl Marx, “Critique of the Gotha Program,” The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. R. 
Tucker, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 1978), 525-541, at p. 531. In contemporary debates it is often referred to as the 
“Needs Principle.” I call it differently, adding reference to “Abilities,” to emphasize that it addresses both the 
demand and the supply side. It states rights to receive, but also, and in conjunction, duties to give.	  
2 I am not saying that we must proceed in a strictly linear way, from DI to DII, and from DII to DIII. Inquiry is of 
course more complex, involving epistemic back-and-forth between these dimensions in an ongoing search for 
reflective equilibrium. In this search, we should also pay serious attention to DIII, which may lead us to rethink our 
views of DI and DII. Thus, the mistakes in the history of communist politics in the 20th century, especially the 
insufficient attention to civil and political rights, should motivate the exploration of principles affirming those rights 
and of institutions implementing them. 
3 I concentrate on pages 528-32 of Marx’s text. There is a debate as to whether Marx held substantive moral views 
about justice. See Norman Geras, “The Controversy about Marx and Justice,” Marxist Theory, ed. A. Callinicos 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 211-67. I agree with Geras that Marx did hold some such views even if he 
did not articulate them properly—or even fully recognized that he held them. 
4 Ibid., 530. On luck-egalitarianism see G. A. Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2008), 7-8. 
5 Albert Einstein, “Why Socialism?” Monthly Review 1 (1949). 
6 Marx, op. cit, 530-1. Marx’s sensitivity to individuals’ differences is missed in Pierre Rosanvallon’s otherwise 
insightful critical discussion of 19th century communism as involving a “desindividualization of the world” in La 
Société des égaux (Paris: Seuil, 2011), 175. On the conversion problem see Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), ch. 12. We can interpret Marx’s criticism of talk of “equal 
rights” for not tracking the specific needs of different individuals as a rejection of certain accounts of equality that do 
not address what ultimately matters (each person’s access to need satisfaction), rather than as a rejection of the idea 
that people have equal rights. 
7 Socialists praise social relations in which “people care about, and, where necessary and possible, care for, one 
another, and, too, care that they care about one another”. G. A. Cohen, Why Not Socialism? (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
	   36	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
University Press, 2009), 34-5. 
8 Socialism may differ in these ways from property-owning democracy. See John Rawls’s discussion of liberal 
democratic socialism and property-owning democracy in Justice as Fairness. A Restatement (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2001), 135-40. For new developments, see M. O’Neill and T. Williamson, eds., Property-
Owning Democracy (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012). 
9 Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 187-90. 
10 Meaningful work has been neglected in liberal political philosophy. Puzzlingly, Rawls acknowledges the 
importance of “meaningful work in free association with others,” but takes its “definition” as not being “a problem of 
justice” (A Theory of Justice, rev. ed.; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999, 257-8). However, recent 
proposals seek to justify reforms at the workplace through fresh developments of Rawls’s theory. For example, 
Samuel Arnold argues that access to work involving authority, responsibility, and complexity is a social primary 
good to be regulated by the difference principle (“The Difference Principle at Work,” Journal of Political Philosophy 
20, 2012, 94-118). 
11 Geras, op. cit. 264-5. I agree with Geras that Marx did assume a view of justice when presenting the principle. 
12 Alec Nove, The Economics of Feasible Socialism Revisited (London: Harper Collins, 1991), Part 1. 
13 Pablo Gilabert, “Cohen on Socialism, Equality and Community,” Socialist Studies 8 (2012), 101-21. 
14 This was central in Ernesto “Che” Guevara’s view of nonalienated work as involving both self-realization and 
“social duty.” See Guevara, El Socialismo y El Hombre Nuevo (Mexico DF: Siglo XXI, 1977), 10-1, 78-90.  
15 Lucas Stanczyk argues that work can be conscripted to enhance the well-being of others beyond emergencies. See 
“Productive Justice,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 40 (2012), 144-64. I take civil and political liberties to be 
normally, not absolutely constraining; there is a presumption in their favor, but it can be defeated by especially 
strong reasons. Thus my view is not necessarily incompatible with Stanczyk’s. But it is hard to see how 
considerations of well-being that go beyond basic needs can outweigh central civil and political liberties (Stanczyk’s 
own examples focus on basic health care—which caters for basic needs and the fair value of liberties themselves). 16	  For exploration of the variety and dynamism of human needs and capabilities as characterized in Marx’s texts see 
Jon Elster, Making Sense of Marx (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 68-74. Ultimately, Marx’s ideal 
of human flourishing involves the “development of the rich individuality which is all-sided in its production as in its 
consumption” (Grundrisse; London: Penguin, 325). We can drop the hyperbolic, infeasible Marxian depiction of 
scenarios in which agents develop all their powers fully, but we can still envision cases in which they achieve a high 
level of development of some powers in some desirable, chosen, and feasible schedule of activities.	  
17 Of course, this desideratum should be constrained by appropriate saving for future generations. 
18 Sen, The Idea of Justice; Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011). 
The Rawlsian account of primary goods as what cooperating persons require to develop and exercise their moral 
powers of rationality and reasonability and to pursue their specific conception of the good is arguably an even more 
general case of this strategy (see Justice as Fairness, sects. 17, 51). For more on the capability approach, see Pablo 
Gilabert, “The Capability Approach and the Debate Between Humanist and Political Perspectives on Human Rights. 
A Critical Survey,” Human Rights Review 14 (2003), 299-325. 
19 Nussbaum acknowledges a debt to Marx in her development of the idea of capability in Women and Human 
Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 13, 70-4. 
20 In alienated labor, workers experience their relation with their productive activity, its products, and other economic 
agents as meaningless or even as antagonistic. Marx, 1844 Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, in Early 
Writings (London: Penguin, 1975), 322-34. 
21 Marx, Capital 1 (London: Penguin, 1990), 739. See also Marx, Grundrisse, 488. 
22 Marx, Capital 3 (London: Penguin, 1991), 957-9. 
23 Marx, “Critique of Gotha Program,” 531. 24	  Gerald Cohen provides instructive critical comments on Marx’s philosophical anthropology as failing to account 
for people’s need for “self definition,” and its fulfillment through special associations. See Marx’s Theory of History. 
A Defense, expanded ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 346-50.	  
25 For example, Nussbaum suggest that we explore people’s capabilities with respect to (1) life, (2) bodily health, (3) 
bodily integrity, (4) the use of their senses, imagination and thought, (5) the engagement of their emotions, (6) the 
use of their practical reason, (7) the development of social affiliation, (8) the concerned relation with other species, 
(9) activities involving play, and (10) the control of their political and material environment. See Creating 
Capabilities, 33-4. Work can of course display many of these, but it is not the only relevant medium. 
  We should also have a broad view of what counts as “contribution” under the Contribution Principle and the ANP. 
For example, it should not only include work in factories and similar sites of formal labor. As feminists have 
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emphasized, for example, it should also include domestic labor. Furthermore, many abilities should be recognized as 
productive from a social point of view. For example, people with certain handicaps may still have important abilities 
to contribute in several ways (and technological development makes this easier).  26	  This is also a salient point in the theory of positive freedom advanced in Carol Gould, Rethinking Democracy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).	  
27 Geras, “The Controversy about Marx and Justice,” 264. 
28 In addition, the standards of needs may be quite general to allow for diverse interpretation and elaborations by 
individuals, thus giving them more liberty (e.g. about what work to pursue if any). Even if we have an expansive 
view of the good when developing our account of relevant needs, we should be mindful of the prospect that people 
will disagree about the details. 
29 See Castoriadis’s articulation of the idea of “geometric proportionality,” according to which A’s ratio of 
contribution over ability may be the same as B’s even if their specific contributions and abilities are not identical. 
Cornelius Castoriadis, Les Carrefours du Laberynthe 1 (Paris: Seuil, 1978), 394. 
30 A possible reply is that although some individual workers might not be fully paid when this distribution occurs, 
they would not be forced, because they belong to the class that collectively controls economic resources and policy 
(in a socialist society). See Nancy Holmstrom, “Exploitation,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (1977), 353-69, at 
p. 363. For discussion see Kymlicka, op. cit., 204 n.11. 
31 Norman Geras, “Bringing Marx to Justice. An Addendum and a Rejoinder,” New Left Review I / 195 (1992), 37-
69, at pp. 60-1. 
32 For a survey of the first two views of exploitation see Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, 177-87. I say 
that my proposal helps “in part” to account for the relational wrong of exploitation. There is room for other accounts 
that are independent from the ANP and capture additional problematic features of exploitation. For example, 
Nicholas Vrousalis suggests that economic exploitation is a form of domination of others for self-enrichment. See 
“Exploitation, Vulnerability, and Social Domination,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 41 (2013), 131-57. 
33 Here I differ with the interpretation by Edward Nell and Onora O’Neill, “Justice Under Socialism,” Justice, 4rd. 
ed., ed. J. Sterba (Toronto: Thomson-Wadsworth, 2003), 77-85, at pp. 84-5. 34	  The worry about expensive tastes (see 3.3 above) can also be partly addressed by mobilizing these considerations 
(which yield the responsibility of each not to make unfair demands on others).	  
35 What is significant, normatively speaking, is effort in a system of fair reciprocity, not actual output, the generation 
of which partly depends on morally arbitrary differences in endowments (such as native talents) and other 
circumstances (such as availability of productive work) whose presence is independent of agents’ control. The 
Contribution Principle arguably partially encodes a concern for fair reciprocity as well, as under it contribution is 
measured quite generally by the amount and intensity of work, and support is given to those unable to work (Marx, 
“Critique of Gotha Program,” 530-1). 
36 The conditionality holds where complete abundance is absent and consumption goods are the result of productive 
efforts. If consumption goods were manna falling from the sky, then distribution would not have to track productive 
efforts. Another caveat: the conditionality considered here assumes focus on consumption goods that meet needs 
above a basic threshold of subsistence and of whatever is required for people to function as political equals. 
Everyone should get support to secure those unconditionally (if feasible). See further discussion in 4.4 below. 
37  Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, 190-3; Richard Arneson, “Meaningful Work and Market 
Socialism,” Ethics 97 (1987), 517-45. Notice that this charge, and responses to it defending (a), can be made both 
within objective and subjective frameworks by referring, respectively, to a plurality of objective goods and 
subjective preferences. An objective framework may or may not be perfectionist, depending on how thick or 
comprehensive the account of the good it relies on is (thus, e.g. Rawls’s framework seems objective without being 
perfectionist—A Theory of Justice, sect. 50). 
38 Jon Elster provides the most systematic exploration of the ideal of self-realization in An Introduction to Karl Marx 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), ch. 3, and “Self-realization in Work and Politics,” Alternatives to 
Capitalism, ed. J. Elster and K. Moene (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 127-58. Elster defines the 
Marxian ideal as follows: “self-realization is the full and free actualization and externalization of the powers and the 
abilities of the individual” (“Self-realization in Work and Politics,” 131). He shows that this formulation involves an 
infeasible ideal and must be changed by dropping reference to the “fullness” of self-actualization, re-characterizing 
its “freedom,” and exploring various ways in which it might succeed in work and politics. Component (f) of my 
interpretation of the ANP is partly meant to recognize these limits. Elster also emphasizes the contrast between self-
realization and consumption. Activities involving self-realization yield raising marginal utility: they are often painful 
at the beginning, but as capabilities are developed and actualized, they become increasingly enjoyable. Consumption 
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involves the opposite trajectory. This is also an important point. But I think that there is a risk of overshooting the 
mark here. Consumption should not be underestimated. Besides the obvious point that it is enjoyable as far as it goes, 
its significance is often a necessary condition for self-realization in productive labor. As Elster himself explains, self-
realization is often partly dependent on the significance of the outputs of the activities in which it arises. Since often 
the output is consumption goods to meet needs, a lowering of the significance of consumption could threaten the 
significance of the corresponding productive activities. To make it more significant, we can also think of ways of 
making consumption more sophisticated. As Elster recognizes, some forms of consumption (e.g. reading poetry) 
themselves involve self-realization, with its upward trajectory of enjoyment (Ibid., 136). 
39 When assessing the implications of the ANP, we should not ignore that any feasible system of distribution depends 
on the existence of a system of production. Relatedly, in our societies most people are not effectively free to opt out 
of work. They have to work to make a living. Work is imposed on them by the social circumstances they face, and 
this makes the duty to offer options of meaningful work more pressing on liberal grounds. See Beate Roessler, 
“Meaningful Work: Arguments from Autonomy,” Journal of Political Philosophy 20 (2012), 71-93, at pp. 76-81. 
   Le me add that including opportunities for self-realization in production may expand the feasibility of meaningful 
activity outside of it. Capitalism generates a ferocious pressure to make as much money as possible and to build 
one’s self-esteem through competitive triumphs over others. Countering this selfish, hyper-competitive ethos, 
socialism could help generate a culture that supports rather than undermine deep relationships (such as friendship) 
that involve genuine care and sincerity. If production is not thoroughly framed by rapacious competition and profit 
maximization, it may also be easier to reduce working time and increase access to other activities and goods. 
40 Carens, “An Interpretation of the Socialist Principle of Distribution,” Social Philosophy & Policy 20 (2003), 145-
77. 
41 Here Carens departs from the earlier statement of his proposal in Equality, Moral Incentives and the Market 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981), 25. In that text Carens takes the social duty to involve a maximal 
contribution, although he assumes that agents will balance this consideration against others (Ibid., 34-5). 
42 It could be objected that organizing workplaces along these lines would hamper efficiency. But in complex 
modern economies a greater involvement of workers may actually increase productivity. Some argue that “the 
information revolution is replacing one kind of management (command-and-control) with another (based on self-
organization networks)” (“It’s Complicated,” The Economist, November 23, 2013, p. 68). Second, given 
environmental threats posed by current forms of growth, insisting on productivity as the decisive evaluative factor 
may be unreasonable. Finally, the idea of efficiency is parasitic on some view of what is to be efficiently delivered. 
Productivity is not the only relevant consideration to be catered for. Increasing satisfaction in work is surely 
important, as are other considerations (such as expanding leisure time). 
43 Carens is in principle open to modifications like the ones I suggest. For example, he acknowledges that income-
consumption could be traded against other concerns and that society might democratically impose constraints on the 
market economy to enable legitimate different tradeoffs (Ibid., ch. 3). 
44 Ibid., 131. 
45 I introduce legal conditionality to deal with the free-riding problem. If and when it doesn’t in fact arise I am happy 
to withdraw it.  
46 The further flexibility in the framework that I suggest would also help if people want to devote themselves to 
forms of work that are not recognized as standard work, such as work at home or in the community. We can also 
recognize these forms of work as counting towards the calculus of the income each would receive. To the extent that 
measurement problems are overcome, this may be the better option.  
  A factor which this framework (and Carens’s) does not fully account for, however, is that the ability to make an 
effort, and to derive satisfaction from work, may vary from person to person due to circumstances beyond their 
control. The same number of hours, or the same activities of work, may not involve the same level of burden for 
everyone. I do not know how to fully solve this difficulty. Perhaps all realistic implementations of the ANP are 
partially subject to Marx’s criticism of the Contribution Principle as not fully responding to all important individual 
differences. Barring unlikely scenarios of complete abundance and lack of conflict of interests, it may be practically 
impossible to reliably allocate job satisfaction, income, leisure, etc., in ways that perfectly track all important 
personal differences and render everyone exactly equally and maximally well-off overall. Our social arrangements 
might have to be better or worse approximations without being perfect implementations. Some possible fine-tunings 
are the following. If each worker identifies work’s burdensomeness, external devices like incentives could 
sometimes be avoided (I owe this suggestion to Kristi Olson). Second, the burdensomeness of work could be 
partially reduced as opportunities for self-realization in work are made available. Finally, the amount of equal 
income accrued to those working beyond the set full-time workday could be reduced via increased taxation the 
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proceedings of which are used to extend further the direct social provision regarding public goods and differentially 
incurred needs. 
47 For example, we certainly want government to continue delivering standard forms of control concerning safety of 
workplaces and products for consumption, even if their details are not uncontroversial. 
48 Carens explicitly brackets the issue of transition (Ibid., 21), but does not deny its importance. Another difficulty he 
does not address is that of staffing socially indispensable but generally undesired jobs, such as garbage collection. 
But one could argue that if people in a socialist society have gained, through experience and socialization, a strong 
attachment to it, they will recognize that they should devote part of their time to these tasks. We could, e.g., require 
“every able-bodied person, say from nineteen to twenty, to take his or her turn at a fair portion of the necessary 
unpleasant jobs” (Kai Nielsen, Equality and Liberty; Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld, 1985, p. 287). This can be a 
case in which restricted forms of (democratically scheduled) compulsory work is justifiable. See note 15 above. 49	  Pablo Gilabert, From Global Poverty to Global Equality. A Philosophical Exploration (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012).	  
50 Pablo Gilabert, “Feasibility and Socialism,’ Journal of Political Philosophy 19 (2011), 52-63. For discussions of 
problems and strategies of political transformation (spanning the spectrum between insurrectional and incremental 
approaches) see Jon Elster, An Introduction to Karl Marx, 163-6; and Erik Wright, Envisioning Real Utopias 
(London: Verso, 2010), Part III. My discussion of transition in this section is avowedly partial. Important issues not 
addressed include the problems of emigration and capital flight, international pressure, and violent resistance. I also 
acknowledge that different transitional paths may be appropriate in different contexts, depending on the course of 
democratic argument and struggle. What follows are some suggestions about what to propose within that process. 
51 The problem of path-dependence becomes clearer when we consider the institutions generated to implement the 
distributive principles. If the state becomes larger in the first stage, it may itself become an obstacle for further 
change (which, in Marx’s ideal, would involve decentralization and autonomous decision-making at the level of 
productive units). Perhaps choosing a form of market socialism would reduce the problem. On market socialism, see 
John Roemer, A Future for Socialism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994). For criticisms, see Cohen, 
Why Not Socialism? sect. IV. 
52 Both of these points are mentioned by Marx to explain why the early stage is still afflicted by a “bourgeois 
limitation.” “Critique of Gotha Program,” 531-2. 
53 Elster, An Introduction to Karl Marx, 99-100; Making Sense of Marx, 230. 
54 Rawls is less optimistic about the wide endorsability of his Difference Principle than about his other principles of 
equal civil and political liberties and of fair equality of opportunity. See, e.g., Justice as Fairness, 95.  
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